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Abstract
This paper explores the differences between executive compensation regimes in
France, the United States, and China. It asks whether there is a link between
state regulation of real options as a form of executive compensation and state
regulation of shareholder protections. This paper argues that if a country
regulates the use of real options as compensation, then that country is also more
likely to have strong shareholder protection laws. This argument seems to be
true based on a descriptive review of executive compensation law and
shareholder protections in France, the United States, and China.
If it is true that countries that regulate real options compensation are more
likely to enact strong shareholders protections, then it is also likely that these
countries are relying on the Crowding Out Theory. Under the Crowding Out
Theory, executive compensation is designed to strike a balance between low
pay, which motivates executives to work harder, and high pay, which
disincentives executives from pursuing alternative forms of compensation that
would harm shareholders.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Institutions, specifically legal institutions, exert significant control
over executive compensation.1 Because the law is a problem-solving tool,
lawmakers reform executive compensation laws when they believe there is
a problem with the way their country’s executives are being compensated.2
However, there is often a lack of consensus among lawmakers on what the
problem with executive compensation actually is, or how executive
compensation should be structured to solve the problem.3 These
disagreements are amplified across countries and cultures, resulting in
differences in the laws addressing, and even defining, executive
compensation.
This paper provides an overview of the differing legal rules for
executive compensation in France, the United States, and China.4 Prior
papers studying the differences in executive compensation law across
countries measured cultural values and highlighted social perceptions of
compensation.5 This paper instead proposes a link between state regulation
of real option compensation and state regulation of shareholder protection.6
1
Laws, litigation procedures, business operating procedures, collective labor
organizations, and taxes are all examples of institutions. See generally John R. Searle, What
is an Institution?, 22 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 15-19 (2005).
2
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1117-19 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta] (explaining that
countries can be grouped into “legal families” depending on “(1) historical background and
development of the legal system, (2) theories and hierarchies of sources of law, (3) the
working methodology of jurists within the legal systems, (4) the characteristics of legal
concepts employed by the system, (5) the legal institutions of the system, and (6) the
divisions of law employed within a system”) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL W.
GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSKAWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITION: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND
CASES ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH,
GERMAN, ENGLISH, AND EUROPEAN LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 1994)).
3
Payments might be gratuitous or improperly influencing executives’ interests. See
Johannes M. Pennings, Executive Reward Systems: A Cross-National Comparison, 30 J.
MGMT. STUDIES 261, 261-62, 265-66 (1993) [hereinafter Pennings] (asking “[W]hat
interpretive schemas do people in different organizations espouse about performance-reward
relationships, and do they signal national differences? Do such schemas mirror values
[power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity] that vary across
nations?”).
4
This paper draws inspiration from cross-cultural studies but focuses primarily on legal
institutions. The data needed to answer a question about the impact of culture on executive
compensation does not exist at present, and in a controlled study with three countries there
would be more control variables than observations.
5
Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and
Corporate Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. AND ECON. 229, 235 (2005) (Table 1A defines the
Schwartz cultural value dimensions (embeddedness/autonomy, hierarchy/egalitarianism, and
mastery/harmony). Table 1B defines the Hofstede cultural value dimensions
(individualism/collectivism,
power
distance,
uncertainty
avoidance,
and
masculinity/femininity)).
6
Shareholders need not be private individuals. Rather, they may be government entities
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The hypothesis is that when a government regulates the use of real options
as compensation, that government is also more likely to have strong
shareholder protection laws.7 This hypothesis seems to be true based on a
descriptive review of compensation law in France, the U.S., and China, but
a quantitative study should be done with a larger group of countries to reach
a definitive conclusion. This question is not about the pay-risk or payperformance sensitivity of stock options compensation, although those
issues are relevant. Rather, the goal is to identify whether governments that
take measures to protect shareholders also limit real option compensation
for executives.8 If governments are relying on Crowding Out Theory it
could explain a correlation between the strength of limits on real options as
a form of executive compensation, an indirect form of shareholder
protection, and the strength of more direct shareholder protection laws. A
future qualitative study might consider controlling for the prevalence of
state shareholders in different regimes, a factor explored in part below.
In Part III, this paper discusses the wide variety of forms that
executive compensation can take and explores lawyers’ and economists’
theories on the functions that executive compensation may serve depending
on its structure. This paper primarily relies on the Crowding Out Theory,
under which executive compensation is designed to strike a balance
between low pay, which motivates executives to work harder, and high pay,
which disincentives executives from pursuing alternative forms of
compensation that would harm shareholders. In Part IV, this paper
discusses the actual practices and laws used to structure and limit executive
compensation in France, the U.S., and China. In Part V, this paper explains
common methods of shareholder protection. In Part VI, this paper provides
an overview of how shareholders are protected in each of the three
countries discussed. In Part VII, this paper concludes that, while the
regulation of executive compensation and the prevalence of shareholder
protection measures seem to be related, quantitative work needs to be done
on the topic.
II.

LIMITATIONS
Comparing specific laws is valuable because these three countries,
China and France in particular, frequently look to other nations’ laws when
developing their own, such as when defining fiduciary duties. However, the
mechanisms that work to address risky compensation under one system do
not necessarily translate into another, and it is important to understand how
such as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
7
Options can be stock options or real options. This paper focuses on real options,
which are all the choices executives make in a business context, such as the flexibility to
engage in self-dealing, to steal, to not work hard, or to abuse executive perks.
8
Ramón Abascal & Francisco Gonzále, Shareholder Protection and Bank Executive
Compensation After The Global Financial Crisis, 40 J. FIN. STABILITY 15, 34 (2019).
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the adoption of a single law would actually impact a different economy or
legal system.9 The strength of executive compensation regulations is also
not the only cross-country variable, as both state ownership and direct
shareholder control over pay clearly play a role in the way real option
compensation manifests. These factors should be given more consideration
in a future paper. The significantly different legal regimes in each country
and their distinct economic histories, ranging from heavy state involvement
to relatively unregulated risk-taking, provide insight into why options might
be a concern for China, where they have a demonstrated potential for abuse,
but are far less of a concern for France. Further, the various legal
enforcement mechanisms, agencies, and international organizations that
create binding or soft laws either have different goals depending on the
context or take unique paths to reach the same goal.
Because this paper only examines a limited part of a low-government
control regime (U.S.), a mid-control regime (France), and a high-control
regime (China), a future paper could ask a more specific question about the
strength and clarity of specific compensation laws in each nation,
potentially by observing how different countries’ federal income tax laws
define and treat gifts in the context of compensation.10 Further, a future
study could compare the length of time different countries’ shareholders
wait in court to litigate claims under equivalent laws (such as violations of
fiduciary duties, which vary across countries), how much shareholders
recover, and how often shareholders win.
If a future paper asks more specific questions about how laws affect
companies in one or more of the countries discussed, there might be issues
with data collection. French and American executives in private companies
are not required to disclose pay, so this data is not available for comparison,
and Chinese executives of listed State-Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs)
subsidiary companies do not disclose pay if they are paid by the unlisted
parent rather than by the listed subsidiary.11 Even if this data were
available, there is a selection bias among companies that choose not to list,
which could affect their decisions on executive compensation.12
9

Shen Wei & Casey G. Watters, Do All Roads Lead to China?: Scholarship of Chinese
Commercial Law in the Past Decade (Part 1), 16 CHINA REV. 165, 168 (2016) [hereinafter
Wei] (It is naive to think China can simply adopt, by legal transplants, comprehensive
commercial law statutes from other jurisdictions and achieve the same results.).
10
E.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 102 (2010); T.D. 1-655, 97 C.B. 1 (1919)(discussing Revenue
Act of 1918 § 213); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 718 (1929)
(“Employer’s payment of income taxes assessed against employee held to constitute
‘additional taxable income’ to employee, as consideration for services rendered.”).
11
Li-Wen Lin, Revisiting Executive Pay of China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Formal
Design, Fresh Data, and Further Doubts, 19 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 27, 29 (2018) [hereinafter
Li-Wen Lin].
12
There are many factors other than reporting requirements that influence companies
not to list their shares on stock exchanges.
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III. HOW CAN EXECUTIVES BE COMPENSATED?
While money is the first thing that comes to mind when discussing
compensation, payment is not always straightforward, and in fact can be
nearly impossible to quantify or to identify at all.13 Executive compensation
can, and should, include obvious elements, such as a salary, bonus, stock
options, stock appreciation rights, a performance share plan, deferred
compensation, healthcare, or a pension. However, compensation can also
include less obvious and more questionable elements such as a golden
parachute, the opportunity to engage in self-dealing, and other privileges
that vary widely based on external factors such as shareholder protections,
social norms, and the individual being compensated.14
After lawmakers have identified the form executive compensation
tends to take in their country, they must then consider various theories of
compensation to improve compensation’s function. These theories address
a range of issues from solving the agency problem, to keeping executives in
check, to maximizing executive performance, to attracting talent, to
identifying non-pecuniary incentives. It is not until form and function are
considered together that lawmakers can address perceived problems with
their country’s compensation laws.
a. Forms of Compensation
All executive compensation fits into one of two categories: it is either
non-pecuniary compensation or pecuniary compensation.15 Non-pecuniary
13
If compensation were strictly pecuniary, an attorney with a market value of $190,000
USD annually would never accept a federal clerkship for $50,000 USD annually. However,
this choice is not uncommon because of non-pecuniary compensation. In this situation, the
hypothetical attorney values adding “federal clerkship” to their resume at $140,000 USD,
whether that value is coming from increased reputation, status, value in the labor market, or
from personal enjoyment of the experience.
14
See TAPOMOY DEB, MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 396
(1st ed. 2009). See generally ELIZABETH A. ISING ET AL., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SEC’S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
DISCLOSURE RULES (2016), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/
publications/Ising-Mueller-Hanvey-Executive-Compensation-Disclosure-HandbookDonnelley-Financial-Solutions-Oct-2016.pdf (discussing salaries, bonuses, stock awards,
option awards, non-equity incentive plans, pensions, nonqualified deferred compensation,
plan-based awards, outstanding equity awards, payments upon termination or change in
control, and golden parachutes); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are,
and How We Got There, HANDBOOK OF ECON. FIN. (2012) (describing various forms of
executive compensation present during, or prior to, 2012). See also Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (pioneering a theory of ownership structure
for the firm based on the theories of: (1) agency; (2) property rights; and (3) finance).
15
See, e.g., Yannis Georgellis et al., Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Aspects of SelfEmployment Survival, 47 Q. REV. ECON. AND FIN. 94, 106 (2007) (providing an example of
how pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation work in conjunction). See also Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, 3 J.
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compensation means non-monetary benefits and is an extremely broad
category, encompassing economic and social factors such as job
satisfaction, future career opportunities, and prestige. Pecuniary
compensation includes the most obvious traditional forms of payment,
including salary, stock options, and bonuses. Pecuniary compensation can
be either riskless or risky, and risky compensation exists as either explicit
compensation or as real options.
Executive
Compensation

Non-Pecuniary
Compensation

Career
Advancement

Perks

Prestige

Interesting
Work

Pecuniary
Compensation

Riskless
Compensation

Risky
Compensation

Explicit
Compensation

Riskless compensation includes salaries and pension plans, which are
relatively certain.16 Risky compensation can be either explicit compensation
or real options, both of which are relatively uncertain.
Explicit compensation includes stock and stock options, whereas real
options include all strategic business choices, not just financial options.17
Real options therefore include all choices executives make in a business
context.18 Ideally, the executive will choose to maximize business
opportunities and minimize its obligations, but the executive can choose
illicit real options instead, such as the flexibility to engage in self-dealing,
to steal, to not work hard, or to abuse executive perks. Financial options are
a subset of real options, where the executive has a specific right to buy or
Applied Corp. Fin. 36, 45-46 (1990) (discussing problems with pecuniary and non-pecuniary
incentives).
16
See Deb, supra note 14, at 394.
17
See Keith J. Leslie & Max P. Michaels, The Real Power of Real Options, 3 THE
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 5, 6, 10 (1997) (“[A]ll business decisions are real options, in that
they confer the right but not the obligation to take some initiative in the future.”
Overlooking real options and considering only explicit compensation would “ignore the
value of flexibility.”).
18
Id. at 17.
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sell one of the company’s financial assets.19
b. Functions of Compensation
The primary goal of compensation is to pay an individual for their
services because those services cannot be obtained without compensation.
However, while obtaining services is the most important objective, the
secondary goals of compensation—aligning directors’ interests with
shareholders’ interests, attracting talent, and discouraging theft—are still
extremely relevant.20 The following theories explore the range of goals a
compensation committee might have when setting executive compensation
and the compromises the committees might make in pursuit of those goals.
These theories will be broken down to reflect five major goals: (1) solving
the agency problem; (2) keeping executives in check; (3) maximizing
executive performance; (4) attracting talent; and (5) identifying nonpecuniary incentives.
Agency Theory, Optimal Contracting Theory, Crowding Out Theory,
and Risk Adjustment Theory seek to solve the agency problem. Under
Agency Theory, some incentives align the executive’s interests with
shareholders’ interests while others push these parties’ interests further
apart.21 Optimal Contracting Theory optimistically suggests that executive
compensation is a governance mechanism that resolves agency conflicts
with shareholders.22 Under Crowding Out Theory, determining executive
compensation means balancing low-pay, which motivates executives to
work harder, with high-pay, which disincentivizes executives from pursuing
alternative forms of compensation that might harm shareholders.23 Under
Risk Adjustment Theory, executives who hold riskier forms of
compensation must be compensated with salaries and bonuses that offset
the risks and incentivize them to take an appropriate amount of risk for the
company.24
19
Id. at 12 (“[W]hereas a financial option is acquired and exercised in a deep and
transparent market, real business situations usually feature a limited number of players
interacting with one another, each of which can influence the . . . option value.”).
20
See Marco Heimann et al., Peoples’ Views About the Acceptability of Executive
Bonuses and Compensation Policies, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 661, 663–64 (2015)(In the context
of executive compensation, the dimensions of social justice are: (1) retributive; (2)
procedural; (3) distributive; and (4) restorative justice). The corresponding renumeration
strategies are: (1) high renumeration; (2) transparency and fairness in resource allocation; (3)
the attribution of renumeration; and (4) special bonuses for adversely affected employees.).
21
Pennings, supra note 3, at 263-64.
22
Lin Lin, Regulating Executive Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 J.
L. & COM. 207, 210-211 (2014) [hereinafter Lin Lin]; Rim Ben Hassen et al., Executive
Compensation and Ownership Structure, 31 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 593, 594 (2015).
23
Deb, supra note 14, at 381. (explaining that executives might take advantage of real
options if they do not receive enough pecuniary compensation).
24
Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1179 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas].
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Bargaining Power Theory and Board Capture Theory focus on keeping
executives in check by preventing executives from setting their own
compensation to the detriment of the company. Under Bargaining Power
Theory, executives have substantial power in hostile takeovers and can
bargain for greater compensation, such as accepting a large personal
payment to relinquish their seat on the board and facilitating friendly deals
while benefitting themselves.25 Under Board Capture Theory, the
executives on the boards of public companies who nominate directors are
rewarded with significant compensation for those nominations and are
therefore incentivized to keep compensation high.26
Expectancy Theory, Teamwork Theory, and Tournament Theory seek
to maximize executive performance. Under Expectancy Theory, effort is
tied to performance and performance is tied to rewards, which may inspire
executives to expend greater effort.27 Under Teamwork Theory, unequal
pay fosters rivalry, so executives are less competitive when their
compensation is relatively equal.28 Finally, under Tournament Theory,
winning the highest executive compensation package is seen as a way to
demonstrate that an executive has outcompeted their peers.29
Human Capital Theory, Marginal Revenue Product Theory, Efficiency
Wage Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, and Superstar Theory ask how
companies can attract and keep talented executives. Under Human Capital
Theory, the higher an executive’s human capital (skills, connections, and
experience) the higher that executive’s compensation.30 Under Marginal
Revenue Product Theory, determining executive compensation means
weighing the availability of jobs against the availability of executives
capable of performing the work.31 Similarly, under Efficiency Wage
Theory, when an executive’s compensation is higher, the executive is less
likely to leave the company and more likely to work for the company.32
Under Opportunity Cost Theory, when an executive’s compensation is
25

Id. at 1178; See generally STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, N.Y.U., EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (Jennifer Carpenter &
David Yermack eds., 1999) (discussing the conflicted, “interlocking” nature of
compensation decisions, resulting from the board’s involvement in the process).
26
Thomas, supra note 24, at 1176 (arguing that “Marginal Revenue Product Theory,
Tournament Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, Bargaining Theory, and Risk Adjustment
Theory-[offer] better explanations for the international CEO pay gap than Board Capture
Theory”).
27
Pennings, supra note 3, at 263 (Expectancy Theory posits individual differences,
while Agency Theory treats individuals in a standardized fashion.).
28
Lin, supra note 11, at 49.
29
Deb, supra note 14, at 379-81 (discussing Marginal Revenue Product Theory, Human
Capital Theory, Efficiency Wage Theory, Opportunity Cost Theory, Superstar Theory,
Tournament Theory, Figurehead Theory, Stewardship Theory, and Crowding Out Theory).
30
Id. at 380.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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higher than other executives’ compensation, the less likely that executive is
to leave the company in search of higher compensation.33 Finally, under
Superstar Theory, talented executives are compensated disproportionately
as compared to less talented executives because the talented executives
cannot be replaced.34
Figurehead Theory and Stewardship Theory highlight the nonpecuniary incentives which executives might find attractive. Under
Figurehead Theory, status gained by becoming a figurehead is a form of
non-pecuniary executive compensation.35 And under Stewardship Theory,
executives are similarly compensated by shareholder satisfaction, in part
because they are shareholders’ “stewards” who are acting in shareholders’
best interests.36
While this is by no means a comprehensive overview of executive
compensation theory, thinking about the different theories a compensation
committee or lawmaker might use to structure executive compensation
provides a framework to think about the benefits and risks compensation
can present to directors and shareholders. This paper will primarily work
within Crowding Out Theory, focusing on the idea of regulating real
options compensation to disincentivize executives from pursuing the types
of alternative compensation that harm shareholders. If governments are
relying on Crowding Out Theory, this could explain a correlation between
the strength of limits on real options as a form of executive compensation,
an indirect form of shareholder protection, and the strength of more direct
shareholder protection laws.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
REGULATION, INSTITUTIONS, & ACTUAL PRACTICES IN
FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, & CHINA
Asking how real options are regulated as a form of executive
compensation in a low-government control regime (U.S.), mid-control
regime (France), and high-control regime (China) is important because the
issue of fairness in executive compensation has become increasingly
contentious since shareholders suffered through the 2008 global financial
crisis.37 With recent changes in the law, France now has strong executive
compensation laws, the United States has moderate executive compensation
laws, and China has comparatively weak executive compensation laws.
33

See Id.
Id.
35
Id. at 381.
36
Id.
37
Ramón Abascal & Francisco González, Shareholder Protection and Bank Executive
Compensation after the Global Financial Crisis, 40 J. FIN. STABILITY 15 (2019) (explaining
the financial crisis as an “exogenous shock potentially affecting banks’ investment
opportunities” and focusing on the change in pay-risk sensitivity and risk-taking incentives
embedded in executive compensation before and after the crisis).
34
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For example, France is subject to E.U. laws which regulate executive
compensation aggressively. One such law is Sapin II, a “Say on Pay” law
that gives shareholders a binding vote on whether or not executives’
salaries should be reduced.38 In the comparatively moderate United States,
the federal government has increased its focus on “reasonable”
compensation, of which options are a significant part, but there is a circuit
split and no clear federal limit. Finally, China faces significant challenges
when regulating real options because executives exercising those options
are frequently agents of the state, and the state is overwhelmingly a
shareholder in public Chinese companies.
Given the lack of data on compensation and the impossibility of
evaluating the prevalence or value of non-pecuniary compensation, the goal
is not to evaluate the true financial impact of laws addressing executive
compensation.39 The following review of legislative history is instead
meant to provide background on some of the key executive compensation
issues that France, the United States, and China have addressed over the last
century, and to explore the ways that lawmakers in each country perceive
compensation’s form and function. Further, this overview examines the
degree to which option compensation seems to be a concern for each
country’s lawmakers, and evaluates whether the laws in place are achieving
the desired effect of restricting executives’ use of option compensation
where lawmakers have decided that it is a problem.
a. France
Beginning in the 18th century, the French State was a major owner and
controlling shareholder in a variety of large companies.40 Because French
law grants controlling shareholders significant rights, the government was
able to exercise considerable influence over the economy.41 After France
opened nationalized companies to private investors in the post-war period
and created a mixed economy, corporate executives had more flexibility to
pursue diverse business goals, although the state still had to approve
directors’ business plans.42 While private ownership has significantly
38
Irene Bucelli, Glass, Lewis & Co., France’s First Binding “Non” on Say-On-Pay,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/07/frances-first-binding-non-on-say-on-pay/
[hereinafter Bucelli].
39
Private American and French companies do not have to report compensation and
there is inaccurate SASAC data in China. See China Daily, State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission of the State Council (2020), http://en.sasac.gov.cn. (The
State Council operates the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(“SASAC”) to track economic performance of Chinese companies.).
40
James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 40 (1998) [hereinafter Fanto]; La Porta, supra note 2, at 1118
(French law is civil law.).
41
Fanto, supra note 40, at 40.
42
Id. at 41 (“The State often operated a profit-making business for purposes unrelated to
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increased over the past half-century, state control is not entirely absent from
French corporate governance, and the concept of state control over
executives is prevalent.43
In 1994, the Committee for Banking Regulation recommended that
French companies publicly disclose information about executive
compensation.44 By 2001, France heightened restrictions on self-dealing
transactions and on executive compensation in the form of options. Against
this background, and in the face of mounting press coverage on executive
pay, France responded to the 2008 financial crisis by reforming executive
compensation.45 In the immediate period following the crisis, France
addressed “golden parachutes.”46 More recently, the French Anticorruption
Agency enacted Sapin II, which outlined how to manage risk and
established binding “Say-on-Pay” voting.47 These changes occurred against
a backdrop of extensive, if somewhat disordered, mandatory disclosures of
company information to shareholders and variable voting rights.48
In the early 2000s, France built on existing regulations to prohibit selfdealing contracts, a form of real options, by board members in high-risk
transactions.49 While French law addressed self-dealing transactions as
early as the late nineteenth century, it was not until the early 2000s that
France set procedures to govern transactions where an officer, director, or
10% shareholder had an interest, however indirect, in a transaction.50 Now,
a majority of a French board’s disinterested members must approve the
transaction, the chairman of the board must obtain a statutory auditor’s
report, and a majority of disinterested shareholders must also approve the

the specific financial well-being of the firm, such as to address unemployment, distribution
of credit, and public services.”).
43
Id. at 43-44.
44
Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Executive Compensation-setting Practices in
France, 33 LONG RANGE PLAN. 527, 531 (2000).
45
PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS POWER: CORPORATE CONTROL
IN EUROPE AND JAPAN, 173 (2011) (In April 2009, 1.5% of French articles covered executive
compensation.).
46
Geneviève Helleringer, Related Party Transactions in France - A Critical
Assessment, 4 n.13 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 474, 2019) [hereinafter
Helleringer].
47
Bucelli, supra note 38; Philippe Bouchez El Ghozi & Morgan A. Heavener, French
Anticorruption Agency Issues Detailed New Guidelines for Compliance with Sapin II (Apr.
16, 2018), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=4c43866a-23346428-811c-ff00004cbded [hereinafter Bouchez].
48
Fanto, supra note 40, at 48–51 (A company may grant a shareholder double voting
rights if he or she holds shares in registered (as opposed to bearer) form for at least two
years.).
49
Helleringer, supra note 46, at 7. Cf. Pennings, supra note 3, at 268 (explaining that
French executives “are not for sale” and do not require contracts, although French law
explicitly prohibits executives from forming self-dealing contracts in many cases).
50
Helleringer, supra note 46, at 7 n.32.
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transaction.51 Further, no company is permitted to make loans on behalf of
an inside director unless that director is a legal person, eliminating the
opportunity for self-dealing through loans.52 One issue with this law is that
“indirect interest” is left somewhat undefined in the French statute,
although board chairs, directors, and CEOs of both listed and unlisted
companies can be criminally liable for abusing a corporation’s assets.53
Starting around 2007, France increased government scrutiny of
“golden parachutes,” a type of pecuniary compensation, by prohibiting
companies from paying resigning corporate officers any deferred
compensation that was not conditional on their achievement of performance
objectives.54 The French Business Confederation’s 2008 Code of Corporate
Governance (unenforceable soft law) went even further, prohibiting
“golden parachutes” altogether.55 These real and aspirational changes were
a step towards tying performance to compensation, but they did not legally
force companies to tie performance to compensation across the board.
Although some French executives have taken the radical step of voluntarily
forgoing receiving bonuses, French law does not completely prohibit
executives from receiving bonuses unrelated to performance.56 On balance,
however, executive compensation laws in France are extremely progressive.
Further, as an E.U. member state, France is subject to E.U. regulations,
many of which have been catalysts for change in French law. One of the
E.U.’s first initiatives against excessive executive compensation came on
July 6, 2010, when the European Parliament adopted the Capital
Requirements and Bonuses Package (“CRBP”). As part of the Capital
Requirements Directive (“CRD”), the CRBP initiative affected European
banks by capping cash bonuses at 30% of the total bonus (and at 20% for
“large bonuses” as defined by France), requiring that 50% or more of each
bonus be comprised of contingent capital or shares, and mandating that
40% or more of each bonus be deferred (60% for “large bonuses” as
defined by France) for at least three to five years, then reduced based on
how the executive’s transactions turn out.57 While this law applies only to
51
Id. at 8-9; CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-38, art. L.
225-40, para. 2, art. L. 225-40, para. 2-4.
52
Helleringer, supra note 46, at 10; COMMERCIAL CODE art. L. 225-43.
53
Helleringer, supra note 46, at 8, 12 (summarizing COMMERCIAL CODE art. L. 242-6).
54
See Georges A. Cavalier, On French Interventions in the Financial Crisis, 35 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 785, 792 (2010) (noting that the 2007 TEPA Law in Favor of Labor, Employment
and Purchasing Power “ensure[s] that ‘golden parachutes’ are not a ‘reward for failure’”)
[hereinafter Cavalier]. See generally Hervé Touraine & Olivier Bernard, Structured finance
and securitisation in France: overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (2016),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-5010172?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true].
55
Cavalier, supra note 54, at 792-93.
56
Id.
57
Oxford Analytica, E.U. Adopts New Executive Pay Standards, (Jul. 12, 2010, 6:00
AM) https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/09/eu-executive-pay-business-oxford-analytica.html.
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E.U. banks, E.U. operations of foreign banks and institutions, and thirdcountry subsidiaries of E.U. banks, it represents a strong critique of
executive pay unrelated to performance across all industries in the E.U.58
In 2013, the CRD introduced “Say on Pay” voting through soft law,
which France formally adopted through national legislation.59 Later, the
May 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive (“SRD”) recommended that
shareholders review executive compensation on a long-term basis, a
measure which France has also adopted.60 The European Council began
planning the law in 2013, inspired by Switzerland’s then-new initiative to
empower shareholders.61 While E.U. member states interpret the directive
according to their national systems of law, a core part of SRD is providing
shareholders with information about executive compensation so
shareholders can more effectively regulate executive pay.62
In 2018, France set out a six-step method under Sapin II to prevent
risks related to corruption, which fall under the options category of
executive compensation.63 Companies with over 500 employees and annual
revenues in excess of 100 million euros must identify how risk will be
mapped, identify corruption risks “inherent” in the company’s activities,
evaluate the company’s exposure to the identified risks, assess whether
current risk management methods are sufficient, address outstanding risks,
and regularly update the risk map.64 Unlike the French Business
Confederation’s unenforceable soft-law measures against “golden
parachutes,” the Sapin II guidelines hold more legal weight.65 While the
guidelines published by the AFA (the regulatory body created by Sapin II)
are non-binding, they are strong indicators of what the French Public
Prosecutor will prosecute, and the AFA can sanction qualifying companies
that violate the guidelines.66 Also in 2018, France established “Say on Pay”
58

Id.
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338.
60
See Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term
Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1.
61
John O’Donnell & Sinead Cruise, Europe Moves Towards Swiss-Style Executive Pay
Curbs, (Mar. 6, 2013, 8:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-pay/europe-movestowards-swiss-style-executive-pay-curbs-idUSBRE9250WM20130306.
62
BROADRIDGE, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE: ADVANCING TO A STATE OF
READINESS 4 (2017); Directive 2017/828/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 17 May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards The Encouragement of LongTerm Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 2.
63
Bouchez, supra note 47.
64
Id.
65
Law No. 2016-1691 on Transparency, Fighting Corruption and Modernizing
Economic Life. This law is binding.
66
George A. Stamboulidis, Susrut A. Carpenter & Sophie Rouach, Two Years Since
59
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voting under Sapin II.67 This drastic measure against executive
compensation reflects the goals of the E.U. 2017 SRD.68 While a soft-law
version of “Say on Pay” has been a part of French law since 2013, listed
companies now face binding ex-ante and ex-post votes on executive
compensation.69
b. United States
The United States regulates executive compensation through both state
and federal laws.70 In the 1970s, a shift in executive pay towards perks and
options inspired the SEC to expand disclosure requirements surrounding
executive compensation.71 This development contributed to the issue of
“unreasonable” compensation, although different federal circuits have dealt
with the problem in different ways.72
More recently, the U.S. federal government has heightened disclosure
regulations after excessive use of options contributed to the 2008 financial
Sapin II: Is France Now a Player in the Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement Arena?,
BAKERHOSTETLER (June 24, 2019), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/two-years-since-sapinii-is-france-now-a-player-in-the-global-anti-corruption-enforcement-arena (The AFA cannot
investigate or prosecute criminal offenses and cannot settle with target companies through
the CJIP process. It can only refer Sapin II violations to the French Public Prosecutor, the
Parquet National Financier.).
67
Id.; Alain Pietrancosta, Say on Pay: The New French Legal Regime in Light of the
Shareholders’ Rights Directive II, 3 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER [R.T.D.F.]
105, 107 (2017) [hereinafter Pietrancosta].
68
Pietrancosta, supra note 67, at 106-08 (explaining that remuneration policy must
“contribute to the company’s business strategy and long-term interests and sustainability and
shall explain how it does so” and “explain how the pay and employment conditions of
employees of the company were taken into account when establishing the remuneration
policy” (Art. 9(a)(6))).
69
Id. at 107; Bucelli, supra note 38 (explaining that an ex-post vote addresses
remuneration for the former CEO for fiscal year 2018, while an ex-ante vote addresses
proposed remuneration for the current CEO for fiscal year 2019).
70
See generally Sarah H. Burghart, Overcompensating Much? The Impact of
Preemption on Emerging Federal and State Efforts to Limit Executive Compensation, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 669 (2009) (analyzing a selection of state and federal laws that
control executive compensation).
71
KEVIN J. MURPHY, THE POLITICS OF PAY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 4-5 (2011). Item 402 of the Securities Act regulating executive
compensation was implemented in 2006. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2020), LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/229.402. See generally Robert E. Scully
Jr., Executive Compensation, the Business Judgment Rule, and the Dodd-Frank Act: Back to
the Future for Private Litigation?, 36 FED. LAW. (2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/dftitle-ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-58.pdf.
72
Sean Morrison & Andy Howlett, A Big Return to Reasonable Compensation, 163 Tax
Notes Fed. 1957, 1960-61 (2019) [hereinafter Morrison] (explaining the modern American
reasonableness standard); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. (“The Congress shall have Power to
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”).
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crisis. Similarly, state courts—and Delaware’s courts in particular—have a
robust body of law used to protect shareholders when executives breach
their fiduciary duties by engaging in conflicted transactions.73 At present,
federal securities law applies to reporting companies and mandates
disclosure, federal tax law applies to all companies and deals with questions
of reasonableness, and Delaware General Common Law applies to
companies incorporated in Delaware and enforces both the fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty.
Since the late 1940s, U.S. federal courts have been asked how much
compensation is reasonable, with different circuits coming to extremely
different conclusions about which factors should be used or whether factors
should be used at all.74 Among courts that use factor tests, there is a general
consensus that an employee’s role within a company, the compensation
received by similarly-situated employees, the “character and condition” of
the company, conflicts of interest, and the consistency of compensation
within the company are all relevant.75 Among courts that use independent
investor tests, the question is “after compensation is paid to shareholderemployees, [does] the remaining profit in the business provide[] a rate of
return on equity that would satisfy an independent investor[?]”.76
At the state level, the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)
outlines directors’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and provides that
executive compensation cannot be a “waste of assets.”77 Under the duty of
loyalty, executives have a responsibility not to engage in conflicted or “selfdealing” transactions, such as setting their own pay, because they cannot
complete this task while remaining fully loyal to their shareholders.78 To
73

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768-81 (2015); DELAWARE
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, Annual Report Statistics (2018). https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/
(Fortune 500 corporations overwhelmingly chose Delaware as their state of incorporation in
2018.).
74
Morrison, supra note 72, at 1960-61.
75
Id. at 1962-66.
76
Id. at 1966. See IRC § 199A Qualified Business Income.
77
See Robert A. Kutcher, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, in BUS. TORTS LITIG., 3, 3 (2d ed.
2005) (“(1) Did a fiduciary relationship exist at the time of the alleged misconduct? (2) If so,
what was the scope of the relationship? (3) Was there a breach of the duties that arose within
the scope of the relationship?”). See generally 7B AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FORMS CORPS. § 143
Complaint, petition or declaration—Allegation—Breach of fiduciary duty—Waste of
corporate assets (2019) (“The fiduciary duty imposed on the directors of a corporation
includes a duty not to waste corporate assets. When a transaction is not approved by a
disinterested board of directors, and there is no shareholder ratification of the transaction, the
court must employ its own judgment in determining whether the evidence shows that the
directors used the utmost good faith and the most scrupulous fairness in approving the
transaction.”).
78
E.g. Espinoza v. Zuckerberg, 124 A.3d 47, 54 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“Where directors
make decisions about their own compensation, those decisions presumptively will be
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avoid a conflicted transaction, which would trigger use of the entire fairness
standard of review should shareholders litigate, Delaware companies often
use compensation consultants.79 Counterintuitively, the introduction of
compensation consultants has actually raised compensation by incentivizing
consultants to set high compensation packages so companies will continue
to use their services.80
There are no legal caps on executive compensation in any of these
federal or state laws, and shareholder votes on executive compensation are
only advisory.81 Further, regardless of the legislative measures implemented
to address excessive risk and unreasonable compensation, American
shareholders are at a disadvantage when litigating violations of federal or
state law. Due to the way American corporate lawsuits are structured,
shareholders’ money will be used to fund the board’s defense attorneys and
may even be used to pay settlements if insurance, indemnity, and personal
liability are not applicable.
c. China
Between 1949 and 1978, China had a centrally planned economy and a
socialist public ownership system.82 Under this arrangement, managers
received a government-determined salary free from equity incentives.83
Over the past half-century, however, the Chinese Communist Party
reviewed as self-dealing transactions under the entire fairness standard rather than under the
business judgment rule.”); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(“[I]nformed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which
corporate directors have a material conflict of interest . . . [protects] the transaction from
judicial review except on the basis of waste.”); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217
(Del. 1979) (“The essence of a claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion
of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes.”).
79
Martin J. Conyon, Executive Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay (Chief
Executive Officer), 64 VAND. L. REV. 397 (2011) (discussing the role of executive
compensation consultants in setting CEO pay).
80
Id. at 406-07 (As of 2011, the five leading consultants advise 70% of all firms in the
S&P 1500, and over 75% of the constituents of the S&P 500.).
81
E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21. See generally Steven N. Kaplan, Executive
Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges,
CHI. BOOTH PAPER NO. 12-42 (2012) (explaining and challenging the American belief that:
(1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their
performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance); Joseph E.
Bachelder III, Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Sept. 17, 2011) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/17/say-on-pay-under-dodd-frank/
(Dodd-Frank Section 951 is not intended to change the fiduciary rules applicable to officers
and directors of public corporations, but a negative say-on-pay vote may be taken into
account as evidence of failure of officers and directors to meet their fiduciary
responsibilities.).
82
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 213.
83
Id. at 214; Qiang Cheng, Terry D. Warfield, Equity Incentives and Earnings
Management, 80 ACCT. REV. 441 (2005) (Equity incentives arise from stock-based
compensation and stock ownership.).
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(“CCP”) has gradually privatized both State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”)
and businesses, decentralized the government, introduced equity incentives
as a form of executive compensation, and separated property ownership
rights from property control rights. These legal changes led to the
prevalence of options as a form of executive compensation in SOEs,
heightening executives’ incentives to engage in collusion–activity that
benefits agents and supervisors at shareholders’ expense.84 China’s
government has responded to this trend by regulating both the transfer of
property rights and the presence of equity incentives in SOEs and private
businesses and by articulating fiduciary duties, but China has yet to draft
legislation limiting options as a form of executive compensation.85
After the “property rights reform” movement led to privatization and
granted SOEs greater property control rights, China’s government
decentralized, giving local officials the ability to promote their
subordinates. This change provided officials non-pecuniary compensation
in the form of bargaining power over their subordinates’ careers.86 During
this period, the government-determined salary that had prevailed for the
prior three decades was loosened to allow for variation in executive
bonuses, further exacerbating the issue of bargaining power, as executive
positions became increasingly lucrative.87
In 1984, the CCP introduced equity incentives to the Chinese economy
for the first time when the SOE Beijing Tianqiao Department Store
Company became a private company limited by shares.88 While the use of
equity incentives is somewhat restricted (Chinese firms can repurchase only
a limited number of shares issued in public offerings to give to their
employees as equity incentives), the use of equity incentives was still a
84
MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S CRONY CAPITALISM 25, 29 (2016) (explaining the social
structures that facilitate collusion, or “crony capitalism,” in China) [hereinafter Pei].
85
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 207-08 (“[T]he primary role of Chinese law in regulating
executive compensation should . . . be to improve the regulatory structure for setting
executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way.”); see also Legal Research Guide:
China, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/china.php
(last updated Dec. 8, 2016)(China has a civil legal system).
86
Pei, supra note 84, at 35; Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 53, 59 (“The personnel
linkages across the government and the SOEs also suggest that the hybrid identity of SOE
managers – as business managers and government officials (perhaps more of the latter) – has
significant impact on incentives. The main incentive of Chinese government officials is
political career advancement rather than formal financial remuneration. Political promotions
permit greater power to develop corrupt patronage networks, through which SOE executives
may engage in systematic looting to amass tremendous personal wealth.”).
87
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 214-15 (By 1988, state-appointed managers could earn up
to 300% more than their average employee, while state-appointed operators could earn up to
500% more.); Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 59 (China has moved towards a dual-pay
system, wherein SOE executives coming from the state system are paid less than SOE
executives coming from outside the state system, who receive a market rate. However,
important state positions are closed to these non-state employees.).
88
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 215.
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notable endorsement of riskier forms of pecuniary compensation.89 Later,
China introduced liability insurance to incentivize executives to take more
risks, and by 2004 stock incentive plans were formally introduced.90
In 1986, the Land Administration Law (“Land Law”) officially
separated property ownership rights from property control rights, creating a
market for land use without requiring the state to relinquish ownership over
the land.91 In 1987 and 1988, administrators formalized procedures
governing, and fees associated with, the sale and transfer of property
control rights. Further regulations followed in 1990 and 1994.92
Significantly, the officials who had gained bargaining power over their
subordinates in the second legal shift now gained power over wealthy
investors as well, because investors were better able to bribe officials to
gain control of land they might not otherwise be able to access.93 Relatedly,
the directors of Chinese corporate boards have less power than directors of
American or French boards because of China’s concern that executives
managing state assets in SOEs might make decisions that fit business goals
rather than national goals.94 Instead, Chinese shareholders exercise power at
the general assembly meeting.
In 2003, the CCP addressed executives’ heightened incentives to
engage in the real option of collusion by founding the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
(“SASAC”), which “give[s] the impetus to [SOEs] . . . to realize
coordinated and sustainable development of enterprises, society and
environment in all respects.”95 Further, in 2006, Company Law introduced
the fiduciary duties of diligence and loyalty.96 Company Law was quickly
followed by the CRSC Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed
89

Id. at 225.
Fidy Xiangxing Hong, Director Regulation in China: The Sinonization Process, 19
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 501, 522 (2011) [hereinafter Hong].
91
Land Administration Law (promulgated by the People’s Republic of China, June 25,
1986, rev’d Dec. 29, 1988, rev’d Aug. 29, 1998, rev’d Aug. 28, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 1999)
available at http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/laws/envir_elatedlaws/200710/
t20071009_109921.shtml; Pei, supra note 84, at 30, 51, 53 (In China, land use rights can be
sold without transferring legal ownership of the land.).
92
Pei, supra note 84, at 51-52.
93
Id. at 31-33, 35.
94
Hong, supra note 90, at 513.
95
STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE
COUNCIL, GUIDELINES TO THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES DIRECTLY UNDER THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT (Nov. 2, 2019, 9:58 PM), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2011/12/06/c_313.htm; Lin
Lin, supra note 22, at 217 (Executive pay increased by 247% between 2001 and 2011.).
96
Company Law (promulgated by the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 29, 1993, rev’d
Dec. 25, 1999, rev’d Aug. 28, 2004, rev’d Oct. 27, 2005, rev’d Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar.
1, 2014) arts. 147-49, available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html;
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 238; Wei, supra note 9, at 172 (The doctrine of good faith takes
on a “unique Chinese flavor,” as U.S. courts apply the doctrine in a comparatively limited
way.).
90
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Companies, which defined the fiduciary duty of diligence, although neither
Company Law nor the CRSC Guidelines explain what a director’s duties
are when setting executive compensation, and directors cannot set their own
compensation.97 In terms of administrative oversight, supervisors in China’s
two-tier board system (a board of directors operates under a supervisory
board, and a CEO can be the chairman of that board) lack the power to
make decisions, and instead check for violations of Company Law or the
Articles of Association.98
While Chinese directors can be held criminally liable for bribery,
embezzlement, and misappropriation, the statutory duties of diligence and
loyalty are not enforceable laws.99 This is significant because China has a
civil law system rather than a common law system, and its courts cannot
establish laws on their own or interpret laws that have not been enacted by
statute.100 Further, it is not clear what compensation China’s executives are
actually receiving. As of 2015, SASAC sets the base salary for all SOE
executives at the same level, including salary, bonuses, pension, health
insurance, and housing subsidies, while bonuses and subsidies are
variable.101 However, the compensation disclosed by SASAC may not fully
account for a significant component of executive compensation: one study
found that executives’ on-duty consumption was between two to fifty times
greater than their annual compensation.102
V.

HOW CAN SHAREHOLDERS BE PROTECTED?
While setting executive compensation involves asking how to
incentivize executives to act properly, setting shareholder protections
involves asking how to prevent executives from acting against
97

GUIDELINES FOR ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF LISTED COMPANIES (2016 REVISION),
CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201804/P02018042733197
4952658.pdf; Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 233-34, 238-39 (citing Xia Jijun & Zhang Yan, The
Conflicts Between Control Rights and Incentives: An Empirical Analysis on the Effect of
Stock Incentives in China, 3 ECON. RES. J. 87, 97 (2008) (The link between executive pay
and performance is weaker when executives are more powerful, and incentives are less
impactful when shareholders have more control because SOE shareholders are
overwhelmingly state organizations who will re-appoint government executives.)).
98
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 218, 234, 239 (citing P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art.
47(9); P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 71; P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts.
38(2) & 47(9)).
99
Hong, supra note 90, at 507.
100
Id. at 509; Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 239.
101
Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 33, 45-48, 56 (2018) (SASAC transplants Western payfor-performance but preserves socialist pay equality.).
102
Lin Lin, supra note 22, at 226 n. 97 (summarizing the findings of a study of 1,320
Chinese listed companies by Yang Rong, Research on Executive Compensation of Listed
Companies of Monopolistic Industries—Based on Perquisite Consumption, 5 FUDAN J.
(SOCIAL SCIENCES ED.) 133 (2011)). See also Li-Wen Lin, supra note 11, at 38.
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shareholders’ best interests and how to empower shareholders to protect
themselves. Instead of balancing incentives to determine what regulations
are appropriate, which is done with executive compensation, this inquiry
instead defines shareholders’ rights, interests, and reasonable expectations,
and enumerates executives’ legal duties. Shareholder rights are generally
enumerated under state and federal law and in a company’s charter,
although in some contexts companies can create shareholder rights
agreements which require shareholders to relinquish legal protections.
Further, shareholders in private companies enjoy fewer protections than
shareholders in public companies because most countries impose stricter
standards on public companies (those that are listed on national stock
exchanges and can more easily reach a greater number of potential
investors and shareholders).
Shareholders can come in many different forms. Some are private
citizens owning a small amount of stock, others are activist hedge funds
purchasing controlling blocs, and others are governments, such as France
and China. While the presence of a state owner may flip the power dynamic
and put the executives in a disadvantaged position compared to the state
shareholders, this is not a situation that shareholder protections are meant to
address. Further, because shareholders’ identities vary, some shareholders
are more vulnerable than others and can be harmed by other, more powerful
shareholders, particularly those with a control bloc.
Regardless of their relative strength, all types of shareholders tend to
rely both on preventative measures (to discourage controlling shareholders,
directors, and officers from abusing minority shareholders), and also on
remedial measures (to permit shareholders to sue the companies, directors,
and officers if their rights are violated or to retroactively vote to reduce
pay) for protection. However, each country defines shareholder rights
differently and places an emphasis on a different method of shareholder
protection (e.g. while France explicitly gives minority shareholders more
voting power against executives, the United States provides many
opportunities for shareholders to pursue legal action).
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN
FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, & CHINA
As we have seen, France has strong executive compensation laws, the
U.S. has moderate executive compensation laws, and China has
comparatively weak executive compensation laws. If the hypothesis is
correct, then France will have strong shareholder protection laws, the U.S.
will have moderate shareholder protection laws, and China will have
comparatively weak shareholder protection laws.
a. France
Like American shareholders, most French shareholders have the right
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to vote in general meetings, to access information, to bring direct or
derivative lawsuits, and to receive dividend payments, all of which can be
modified and limited by a shareholder agreement.103 Similarly, French
shareholders also cast precatory (rather than binding) votes, and boards
must have a high minimum number of independent directors.104
However, France has expanded shareholder rights beyond those
granted in the United States, giving shareholders in limited liability
companies (société à responsabilité limitée (“SARL”)) and shareholders in
stock companies (société en commandite par actions (“SCA”), and société
anonyme) the rights to legally demand answers to questions at general
meetings and to challenge board resolutions, even if the challenger is only a
minority shareholder.105 The amount of stock an individual holds is also
less important under the French default rules than under Delaware’s default
rules or U.S. federal law, as each French SARL shareholder, regardless of
his or her stock interest, can request that a representative convene a general
meeting.106
b. United States
As with executive compensation law, both state and federal laws
govern U.S. shareholder protection law. Because American corporations
overwhelmingly incorporate in Delaware, and because shareholders’ rights
are established in a company’s certificate of incorporation, the DGCL
dominates legal debates over U.S. shareholder rights.107 Notably, American
shareholders can give up rights beyond those in a company’s charter
through a contract known as a stockholders’ agreement or shareholders’
agreement (“SA”).108
In general, however, American shareholders operating under
Delaware’s default rules enjoy one vote per share and vote to delegate the
authority to manage the corporation to a board of directors, all of whom are
103
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reelected after a one-year period and have a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder wealth.109 Shareholders have the ability to sue in either a direct
or derivative lawsuit when directors fail to uphold this fiduciary duty, but
American shareholders largely shoulder the burden of legal expenses.
c. China
China did not establish a stock market until the end of the 20th century,
therefore China’s shareholder protections laws are less than three decades
old.110 While the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in
China was issued in 2001, a 2003 corporate governance report identified
problems with the Shanghai stock exchange. Two issues the report brought
to light were the lack of protections for minority shareholders and the
relative strength of majority shareholders (i.e. state owners) in Chinese
listed companies.111 Since the early 2000s, China has promulgated laws
establishing a duty of good faith for controlling shareholders and
emphasizing shareholders’ right to bring group actions for damages caused
by directors’ and senior officials’ illegal acts.112 When the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) reviewed these and
related changes in 2011, the OECD expressed a generally favorable view of
the reforms. However, the OECD flagged “curbing abusive related party
transactions, enhancing the quality of boards, improving shareholder
protection[,] and curbing market abuse” as areas needing improvement.113
Similarly, research institutions have not come to a consensus regarding the
effectiveness of China’s shareholder protection laws.114 This discrepancy is
109
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partially due to the fact that China’s corporate and financial laws develop
quickly, while China’s explicit oppression remedies and plaintiff-friendly
civil procedure rules develop slowly.115
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper explored the hypothesis that when a government regulates
the use of real options as compensation, that government is also more likely
to have strong shareholder protection laws. This descriptive review of
executive compensation laws in France, the United States, and China is
consistent with the idea that illicit options are less prevalent where
shareholder protections are stronger. Therefore, this paper concludes that
the hypothesis is correct. If governments are relying on Crowding Out
Theory, this could explain the correlation.
This paper recommends that all countries should consider
implementing legislation requiring executive compensation committees to
review shareholder protections and to use them as a starting point when
setting executive compensation. By placing a greater emphasis on the
relationship between shareholder rights and executive interests, meaning
that shareholders’ actual ability to protect themselves would receive
primacy in compensation negotiations, compensation committees could
make more holistic decisions that pick up the slack wherever shareholder
protections are failing. Compensation negotiations would therefore rely on
a modified version of the Crowding Out Theory (under which executive
compensation should strike a balance between low pay, which motivates
executives to work harder, and high pay, which dissuades executives from
pursuing alternative forms of compensation that would harm shareholders)
whereby the specific harms shareholders could experience under the charter
and shareholder agreement would be reviewed in depth. This would create a
direct connection between executive compensation and shareholder rights
because, in practice, these two issues are deeply interrelated.
Although neither this measure nor any other would prevent corruption
and abuse, it would strengthen minority shareholders’ position within a
company, effectively giving shareholders a seat in executive compensation
discussions. Further, controlling shareholders would not have their interests
unduly advanced in this type of negotiation system, as the goal would be to
protect the shareholders who are easiest to abuse by analyzing which rights
are left unprotected or are being given up through shareholder agreements.

shareholder protection in 2013, higher than the U.S., while the World Bank’s Protecting
Minority Investors Index ranked China 119th out of 190 countries: Cambridge studied the
principal-agent conflict in listed companies, while the World Bank studied the majorityminority conflict in small or medium-sized enterprises).
115
Id. at 148-49.

113

